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Suggestions for Title Examination*
The first duty of the title examiner is to ascertain
the chain of title, the line of ownership of the land, from
the present owner back to the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. The chain of title is "as strong as its
weakest link" and a good and marketable title, does not
exist if one or more of the conveyances has been
defective. The chain of title is ascertained by an
examination of the consecutive conveyances by which the
ownership pf the land has passed from the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, through the successive owners, to the
present holder of the title. The examiner'a knowledge
in the first instance is of the present ownership only
and his search, therefore, begins with the conveyance
to the present owner and- ends with that from the
Commonwealth. In many instances the failure of
*This article is an elaboration of the notes of a lecture before
the Middler Class of Dickinson School of Law by Addison M. Bowman, of the Cumberland County Ear. Valuable hints to the student are contained in "How to make abstracts of title and
searches," by Edw. M. Foye, of the Erie Bar, 1896; Fallon on
Conveyancing in Pennsylvania; appendix to Vol. 2, Dunlop's Book
of Forms, 1912.
'Herman vs. Somers, 158 Pa. 424.
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former owners to record their deeds, or the passage of
title by descent at a time so remote that inquiry does
not reveal the foruer owners, prevents the examiner's
continuing his' search to the Commonwealth. As will

be noted hereafter the search must be as complete as
possible ;2 and if the title can then be shown on the records
for a period of time of such lengbh 3 that the statute of
limitations will bar any adverse claims, the chain of
title may be considered satisfactory.
The examiner should write a brief synopsis of each
conveyance or transfer of title, noting the presence or
absence of the requisites of a valid transfer as well as a
description of the land sufficient to identify it. The
order of conveyances in these notes will necessarily be
the reverse, in point of time, of the order in which the
transfers of title adtually took place, the conveyance out

of the Commonwealth being the last to appear on the
notes. 4 These notes should be preserved and indexed
by the attorney, both as to owner and locality of the land,
thereby saving a duplication of work when a subsequent
examination of another tract traces the title into an
ownership common to both.
In Pennsylvania title to real estate is transferred
by grant or deed, will, descent under the Intestate Laws,
out of the
accretion
and patent
prescription,
Ccmnowealth. 5 The examiner must be familiar with
the elements of a valid conveyance in each of these
classes before attempting -the actual investigation of
the records.
2
See
3

post, search for mortgages. Note 47.
Westfall vs. Washlagle, 200 Pa. 181. By act of Apr. 27, 1855.
P. L. 369. Thirty years continuous possession raises"presumption
of title out of the commonwealth; by Act of Apr. 14, 1851, P. L.
615, no right of action exists for recovery of possession after the
expiration of forty years after the right of action accrues. Coble
vs. Coble, 146 Pa. 451; by Act of Apr. 22, 1856, P. L. 532, no
action for recovery of land may be brought after the expiration
of thirty
years from date right of action accrued.
4
See abstract, post.
sTiffany on Real Property, page 828, et seq.
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GRANT'. In the office for recording of deeds7 will
be found the record of all grants or deeds. A careful
examination of the record of the instrument will show (1)
the names of the parties-grantor and grantee-or a
description
from which their identity may
be
ascertained 7a; (2) the date of the deed; (3) the date of
rceording; (4) the place of recording-record book and
page; (5) the consideration; (6) the quantity or nature
of the estate conveyed; (7) the description of the land
conveyed; (8) covenants and restrictions running with
the land, if any; (9) warranty, if any; (10) signature
and seal of the grantor; (11) certificate of acknowledgment by the grantor or probate by witnesses.
DATE. The presence of a date in a deed is not
esserial to its validity. 8 It is the delivery of the deed
which makes it effective and this is a matter which does
not necessarily -appear on the record. The acknowledg..
ment and recording of the ideed are evidence of delivery.9
Delivery must 'be made during the ownership of the
grantor in the deed and the existence of this ownership
depends not only upon his having previously acquired
title ,but upon his not having conveyed it to another prior
to the conveyance to the present grantee.
The
ascertaining of this latter fact is what is usually
denominated the "search Tor adverse conveyances."
8
Revenue stamps on deeds have been required by Act of Congress as follows: From Sept. 1, 1862, to Oct. 1, 1872, and from
July 1, 1898 to July 1, 1901, at rate of fifty cents for each $500,
of consideration; from July 1, 1901, to July 1, 1902 at rate of
twenty-five cents for each $500 over $3,000; from Dec. 1, 1914, to
Sept. 9, 1916, and from Dec. 1, 1917, to the present time, at the
rate of fifty cents for each $500 of consideration. With the
exception of the first period above mentioned conveyances for
the consideration of one hundred dollars or less have been exempt
from7 the tax.
Established by act of May 28, 1715, 1. Si. L. 94.
7
aFriday vs Liebendorfer, 242 Pa. 458; Huss vs. Stephens, 51
Pa. 282.
sGeiss
vs. Odenheimer, 4 Yeatts 278.
9
Clymer vs. Groff, 220 Pa. 580; Cooper vs. Duval, 10 D. R.
475. See Boardmen vs. Dean, 34 Pa. 352.
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CONSIDERATION. The actual consideration for
the conveyance need not be set out.1° It is sufficient
to recite a nominal consideration and in the absence of
such a recital the actual consideration may be shown."
QUANTITY OR NATURE OF THE ESTATE
CONVEYED. In the common law form of deed the
granting clause, or words of conveyance, and the
habendum together designate the quantity and nature
of the estate ganted-whether in fee simple, for life,
in trust, etc. The habendum may enlarge but cannot
lirit the estate created by the granting clause.1 2 Prior
to the passage of the Act of April 1, 1909, P. L. 91, t
fee simple estate was created only when the conveyance
was to the grantee and his "heirs," the word heirts
appearing either in the granting clause or in the
haJbendurn.'3 Under the Act of 1909, supra, the words
"grant and convey", or either one, pass a fee simple
estate unless a lesser estate is specifically named.
DESCRIPTION. A description that is sufficiently
clear to identify the property conveyed is essential. A
mere reference to another insrument that identifies the
property is sufficient."4 A draft of the tract should be
made by the examiner by the use of rule and
protractor or otherwise, to aid in identifying the
property in prior conveyances and in the search for
adverse conveyances.
COVENANTS AND RESTRICTIONS. A careful
reading of the entire instrument'will disclose restrictions
upon the right of the grantee to use the land, charges
on the land and reservations of easements in the grantor
or others.1 "
lOLawrenee vs. Lawrence, 105 Pa. 335. A voluntary deed is
valid.
Lancaster vs. Dolan, 1 Rawle, 231.
"Sprague vs. Woods, 4 W. & S. 192.
2See Tyler vs. Moore, 42 Pa. 374; Berridge vs. Glassey, 112
Pa. 442.
13Tiffany on'Real Property, 45.
2"Equitable Gas Co., vs. Limegrover, 54 Pa. Sup. 250.

IGAct of Nov. 27, 1779, 3 P. & L. Digest, 5921, remitted all
ground rents due the Commonwealth and the Penn heirs reserved
in deeds prior thereto.
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WARRANTY.
The warranty may be generalagainst lawful claims of any person-or special-against
the grantor and persons claiming through hian
Under
the Act of 1909, supra, the form of warranty has been
much simplified by the use of the words "warrants
generally" or "warrants speciaIly" instead of the old
form. Persons acting in a representative capacity or
under order of court usually warrant only against
incumbrances placed on the property by themselves.
SIGNING. The deed -must be signed by the
grantor.' 7 Signing by mark in the presence of
subscribing witnesses is sufficient even though the
grantor is able to write. 18 The seal of the grantor is
essential.
WITNESSES. Attestation by subscribing witnesses
is not necessary if the deed is properly acknowledged.
If not acknowledged the deed may be probated by two
subscribing witnesses before a Justice of the Peace. 9
When the grantor and subscribing witnesses cannot be
produced, or where there were no subscribing witnesses,
the signature of the grantor may be proved before a
Judge of the Court of Common Pleas. 20
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 2".
Acknowledgment or
probate of the execution of a deed is a condition
precedent to recording. Although the Recorder will
frequently record any paper presented to him,,a deed
recorded but not acknowledged or with a defective
acknowledgment, is notice to no one.22 A certificate
"Miller vs. Ruble, 107 Pa. 395. But where record of deed
showed that the grantor had acknowledged the deed but failed to
show his signature, it was held that the certificate of the acknowledgment by the grantor raised the presumption that the grantor
has actually signed the deed. Carr vs. Frick Coal Co., 170 Pa. 62.
IsTiffany on Real Property, Sec. 402.
19Act of May 28, 1815, P. L. 94.
0

155.

2 Acts of March 18, 1775, 1 Sin. L 442; May 25, 1878, P. L.
21See notes 19 and 20.

"Acknowledgment and Probate as

Evidence of Execution of Deeds," 18 Dickinson Law Review, 221.
2-Lancaster vs. Flowers, 198 Pa. 614 (621.)
Myers vs. Boyd, 96 Pa. 427.
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of acknowledgment bearing a date subsequent to the
date of the deed is valid.23 An acknowledgment actually
taken before the execution of the deed is invalid. But
the officer taking the acknowledgment is presumed to
have performed his duty and a contradiction in the date
of the deed and certificate of acknowledgment will be
presumed to be a clerical error in the date of the deed. 24
A valid certificate of acknowledgment should show:
(1) the date of acknowledgment ;25 (2) that the grantor
acknowledged the conveyance as and for his act and
deed ;26 (3) that i was taken before an officer authorized
by law to take acknowledgments ;27 (4) the signature
of the officer; (5) the official seal of the officer; 2 (6)
the date of the expiration of the officers commission ;20
(7) the place of taking the acknowledgment". The
acknowledgment by an 'attorney in fact should be "in the
name" and "as the act and deed of his constituen ' ' .
The Act of April 4, 1901, P. L. 87, abolished the
requirement that a married woman's acknowledgment
be taken separate and apart from her husband.
The acknowledgment may be taken within the State
3
by .anotary public,
2 Justice of the Peace while acting
within his own County as to deeds to be recorded
anywhere rwithin the state2 3 United States Commission
23Fisher
vs. Butcher, 19 Ohio. 406.
24
Coover vs. Manaway, 115 Pa. 338; Fisher vs. Butcher, supra.
25Myers vs. Boyd, supra.
26Myers vs. Boyd, supra.
27Uhler vs. Hutchinson, 23 Pa. 110. Angier vs. Schieflin, 72
Pa. 106.
28Bowser vs. Kramer, 56 Pa. 132. (142.)
20Act of Apr. 4, 1901, P. L. 70.
3ORoss & Co., & Elsbree's Appeal, 106 Pa. 82. Certificate of
acknowledgment of Justice of the Peace is presumed to be that of
a Justice of a County of Pennsylvania where the place of taking
the same, etc., does not appear in the certificate.
31Peters vs. Condron, 2 S. & R. 80. By Act of May 25, 1897,

P. L. 81, prior conveyances by attorneys in fact in violation of this
rule were validated.

32Davey vs. Rufel, 162 Pa. 443. Act of May 25, 1893, P. L.
136-a Notary Public may take an acknowledgment anywhere

within the State.
sShare vs. Anderson, 7 S.& R. 43.
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er,8 ' Recorder of Deeds,3 Judges of the Court of Common
Pleas". It may be taken without the State by a notary
public 8 7 Commissioner of Deeds for Pennsylvania,"
Judges of Courts of Record,"' United States Commercial
Agents,40 Anbassadors" and Consuls."2
LOCATING THE RECORD -OF THE GRANT.
If
the name of the predecessor in title is known, refer to
the "Grantor" index of deeds in the Recorder's Office
and examine all deeds of such owner to the present
owner until the deed conveying the land in question is
found. If the name of the former owner is not known,
refer to the "Grantee" index in this office under the
name of the present owner and examine ell conveyances
into 'him until the deed conveying the land in question
is found. In case this does not produce the deed examine
the "Grantee" Index to Sheriffs' and Treasurer's deeds in
the Recorder's or Prothonotary's Office and the "Grantee"
index of Miscellaneous Records. If no record of title
by grant can be found, inquiry among persons familiar
with the property may disclose the name of the former
owner and whether the title passed by will or descent.
Fortanately most deeds contain a recital of at least the
next preceeding conveyance so that such an exhaustive
search is not ordinarily required."
WILL. Where the conveyance of land to an owner
in the chain of title is by will, this instrument as well as
the index in the office of the Register of Wills must be
examined. A careful reading of the will with verbatim
notes of all portions which in any way affect the title to
the land in question and notation of the date of the will,
the date of the death of the testator, the date of issuance
"Act
5Act
3"Act
"TAct

of March 4, 1901, P. L. 300.
of Apr. 6, 1859, P. L. 383.

of Apr. 13, 1791, 3 Sm. L. 28; 2 P. & L. 2749.
of Apr. 22, 1863, P. L. 548.

3BAct of
"9Act of
4OAct of
4"Act of

Apr.
Mar.
June
Apr.

14, 1828.
23, 1919, 2 P. & L. 2754.
1, 1891, P. L. 159.
2, 1859, P. L. 352.

"Act of Jan. 6, 1827, P. L. 9. See Pa. St. 1920, See 8704 et seq.
43See "Recitals in Deeds as Evidence," 20 Dickinson Law Review, 195.
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of Letters Testamentary or of Administration c. t. a., will
enable the examiner to consult the law and give a sound
opinion on the title. Since the Act of 19174" inheritance
taxes are payable by direct as well as collateral heirs,
the record of the appraisemenit and payment being in the
Registers Office. This tax is a lien for a peiod of five
years from he death of the testator.
DESCENT. Title to the land may have been
acquired by virtue of the intestate laws of the Common
wealth. 45 In case of descent to a number of heirs partition
proceedings may 'have been instituted in the Common
Pleas or the Orphans' Court. 46
In case of partition
proceedings a careful examination of all papers will
disclose facts giving the Court jurisdiction. In such
cases consult the Various acts of Assembly.
Great
care must be taken in case of partition in the Orphans'
Court to ascertain that all recognizances and charges
have been satisfied or released by the parties entitied
Releases of dower and similar charges
are usually
recorded in the "Miscellaneous Record Books" or on the
margin of the record of 1the charge. A judicial sale will
discharge such incunbrances ;47 mere lapse of time wll
not.
PRESCRIPTION Title to real estate may be
acquired by actual, continued, visible, notorious, distinct8
and hostile or adverse possession for twenty one years,
Such title, arising by acts of the parties and not evidenced
by writing will not be disclosed by the examination of
the records in the Recorder's Office.
44Act

521.

of Apr. 1, 1917, P. L. 832; Act of June 2, 1919, P. L

"5Intestate Act of 1917, P. L. 429.
4"Orphans Court Partition Act of 1917, P. L. 337.

4123 C. J., notes 64-67, By Act of Apr. 27, 1855, P. L. 369,

failure to make a demand for payment of a legacy charged on land

for a period of 20 years after it becomes due will bar a recovery
thereof.
Meek's Estate 161 Pa. 360.

"$Llewellyn vs. Buechly, 198 Pa. 642. Act of Apr. 15, 1903,
P. L. 212, provides that any one in possession claiming title may

obtain a rule on any one out of possession asserting a claim thereon to bring an action of ejectment.
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THE ABSTRACT
The result of the examination of the chain of title
may be noted in the following form:
1. DEED
William J. Rose and Sarah, Dated Nov. 29, 1906.
his wife, of Carlisle, Recorded Dec. 28, 1906.
Deed Bk. "B", Vol. 7, p.
Pa.
462.
to
Eastern Real Estate Com- Consideration: $4,000.
pany of Harrisburg, Fee simple.
Pa., a Pa. Corporation. Warranty: Gen.
Ack: Nov. 29, 1906.
Description: Upper Allen Township, Cumaberland
County, Pa. Farm of 132 acres (here is inserted briefly
the courses and distances, metes and bounds, etc.
2. WILL
Susan Rose, Lower Allen
Township,
to
William J. Rose

Died Sep. 3, 1905.
Dated Sept. 27, 1887.
Probated Dec. 4, 1905.
Will Bk. 29, page 63.
Letters Test. to Win. J.
Rose.
..........
I -give, devise and bequeath all my estate, real
and personal to my son, Wn. J. Rose, his heirs and
assigns."
3. DEATH

John Rose, husband of Susan Rose, died Aug. 1,
1887.

(See Deed 1)
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4. DESCENT
Henry M. Smith, of Lower
Allen Township,
to
Susan (Smith) Rose.

Died Apr. 16, 1885.
Letters Adm. May 5, 1885,
to John Smith.
Register's Dkt. 12, p. 25.

Only heir of intestate is a 'daughter, Susan, wife of
John Rose, (Information as to heirs of Henry M. Smith
received from Wm. J. Rose.)
5. DEED

S. J. Harris, Sheriff of
Cumberland Co., as
property
of James
Buck
to
Henry M. Smith.

Description:

U. S. Revenue Stamps $3.
Dated Apr. 29, 1870.
Recorded Apr. 29, 1870.
Sheriff Deed Dkt. 2, p. 513.
Deed Poll.
Consideration: $2650.
Ack. in open Court.
Aug. 29, 1870.

Same as deed 1 above.
6. JUDGMENT
Common Pleas of Cumber-

James Smith
vs
James Buck.

land County.
No. 210 Feb. Term, 1870.
Judgnent entered on bond
due Jan. 1, 1870
All waivers authorizing
sale on fi. fa.
Fi. fa No. 2 April Term,
1870.

(Conveyances 7 to 16, inclusive, are noted in same
manner as the foregoing.)
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17. DEED
John Penn, the Younger,.
-by Anthony Butler,
Attorney in fact: John
Penn, the Elder, by
John F. Mifflin, Attorney in fact
to
Robert White.

Dated Apr. 23, 1790.
Recorded Jan. 3, 1792.
Deed Book "K", Vol. 1,
Page 54.
Fee simple, subject to
ground rent of 1 pepper
corn per an.
Con: 1510 L
Warranty: Special
Ack. Apr. 28, 1790.

Description: Allen Township, Cumberland County,
Pa.
Lot No. 13, Containing 259 acres and 6 per cent
.
for road, etc.
18. POWER OF ATTORNEY
Dated Apr. 29, 1788.
Recorded Aug. 27, 1788.
John Penn, the Younger
to

Anthony Butler

Deed Bk. "H",

Vol.

1,

Page 551.
Ack. Apr. 30, 1788.

19. POWER OF ATTORNEY
Dated Nov. 19, 1777.
Recorded Aug. 27, 1785.
John Penn, the Elder,
Deed Bk. "H",Vol. 1, Page
to
548.
John F. Mifflin.
Ack: Nov. 19, 1777.
Having completed the notes on the chain of title, the
next task of the examiner is the search for liens and
adverse interests as against the present and every former
owner. The following form of tally or check list
frequently used for this purpose will comlete the record
of the search.
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An examination of
indices
in
the
Recorder's
Office under
the "Mortgagor"
the name of each owner named in the check list for'the
period that he held the title, and at least thirty days there
after 9 (sixty days before 1915) will show the mortgages
which might be liens. The entry of the word "satisfied"
In
on the margin of the index is not the satisfaction.
every case the record of the mortgage itself should be
consulted to ascertain if it has actually been satisfied.
Under all circumstances search for mortgages should be
made against all prior owners. The lapse of time does
not -satisfy a mortgage. A judicial sale does not
ordinarily discharge the lien of a first mortgage. 0 Note
all mortgages on the check list and check each as the
record is examined so that none are overlooked.
SEARCH FOR MORTG!AGES,

Search the
SEARCH FOR JUDGMENTS.
judgment index in the Prothonotary's Office against the
names of all persons owning the land during the last ten
years. A judgment entered for purchase money before
the purchaser receives his deed binds his equitable
interest and, when he receives the deed, binds his whole
interest, without revival, the moment the legal title is
vested in him. Waters Appeal, 35 Pa. 523. Altho a
judgment unrevived, is a lien for five years from the
enitry, the sci. fa. to revive may be issued on the last day
of that period 5' and the judgment on the sci. fa. entered
at any time within the following five years will continue
the lien.52 In case of title by descent or will it must be
noted that all debts of the decedent are liens for the
49Act of May 28, 1915 P. L. 631. The holder of a purchase
money mortgage has 30 days from execution in which to record
it without loss of priority. Before this Act the time for recording

was within
60 days from execution.
50
Act of May 8, 1901, P. L. 141, Act of Apr. 6, 1830, P. L. 393,
and 51
amendments.
Act of June 1, 1887, P. L. 289. See Uhler vs. Moses, 200 Pa.
498. 5 2
Specht vs. Sipe, 15 Pa. Sup. 207.
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period of one year from his death." Judgments which
were liens at the decedent's death -are continued as such
for the period of five years from that date. 5' Mechanics
Liens55 and municipal claims are indexed in the judgment
index. Inquiry at the Prothonotary's office may disclose
separate indices for municipal liens, tax liens, equity suits
and ejectment suits, all of which must be consulted. In
case a judgment appears by the index as a lien the
original papers and the entries on the appearance docket
should be examined for releases of the land in question
from the lien of such judgment.
ADVERSE CONVEYANCES.
Search
the
"Grantor" index of deeds in the Recorder's Office against
all owners of the land during the period of their respective
periods of ownership, and six months thereafter,5 6 that is,
from the date of the deed to each owner to a date six
months after the recording of the deed out of him. Note
on the check list opposite the name of each owner the
book and page of each conveyance by him during the
period of his ownership and then examine each deed so
noted to ascertain that no owner conveyed the land prior
to his conveyance to the succeeding owner in the chain
of title. In case of a conveyance by an attorney in fact,
executor, trustee or one in a representative capacity
search both against the principal or decedent and against
the agent or representative. Make this search against
all owners for a search against the owners for a period
of only thirty" or forty years58 before the present date
may not disclose easements and rights which were
5
Sec. 15, Fiduciaries Act of 1917. Sec. 17 of this Act provides for the discharge of land from this lien before the expiration
of the
year by proceedings in the Orphans Court.
5
55*Sec. 15, Fiduciaries Act of 1917.
sSec. 43, Act of June 1, 1901, P. L. 431.
Act of May 19, 1893, P. L. 108, the Grantee has 90 days
within which to record deeds acknowledged -within the State and
56By

6 months within which to record those acknowledged without the
State.
5
7See note 3, supra.
58
See note 3, supra.
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created ,before that time and are still in existence. The
examiner should satisfy himself that the land is not
being held adversely to the owner of record and that it
is not subject to any easement in third parties which
do not -appear on the record. If personal inspection of
the premises by the examiner himself is not feasible
careful inquiry should be resorted to.
In case an owner who has made numerous
conveyances appears in the adverse search it will be
found well wolth the additional time expended for the
examiner to make a separate brief of the conveyances
by such owner, noting dates, place and time of recording,"
grantee and description of the property in each.
The
search for adverse conveyances is usually the most
tiresome work of the examiner and an accurate brief of
conveyances may save a reptition of this monotonous
task.
MISCELLANEOUS
RECORDS.
In counties
where a separate Miscellaneous Index is kept, make an
adverse search in this index the same -as in the case of the
deed index, for powers of attorney to convey, agreements
to sell land, grants of rights of way, easements, etc. In
case a power of attorney ,to convey is discovered the
name of the attorney or agent must be added to the check
list for a period
beginning with the date
of
commencement of his authority and ending with the
conveyance out of his principal, or the revocation of the
authority. These records will be found in the Recorder's
Office.
SHERIFF'S DEEDS. The index to Sheriff's deeds
may be in the Prothonotary's office or in the Recorder's
Office.
Make a search in the "Grantor" Index to
Sheriff's deeds the same as in the case of the search for
adverse conveyances. In case a sheriff's deed appears
in the chain of title it is important that the record of all
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proceedings leading up to the sale be examined carefully
and that the deed be "acknowledged in open Court."' 5°
TREASURER'S
DEEDS.
The search
for
Treasurer's Deeds should be made in the index of such
deeds, if any, in the Recorder's office and in the Office
of the County Treasurer. In addition consult the list
of returned taxes in the Treasurer's Office and in the
County Commissioners Office 0 for the period beginning
at least two years prior to the last treasurer's sale of
land for taxes to ascertain whether the tract has been
returned as unseated61 or seated 62 for non payment of
*taxes. The laws relating to the county or city in
question must always be consulted in matters of taxation
and titles under tax sales.
TAXES. In addition to the examination of the list of
returned taxes in the County Treasurer's Office, the "Tax
Lien Docket" in the Prothonotary's office as well as the
local collector's and the city treasurer's, in cities, should
be consulted. 63 State taxes are a Hen on the real estate
of a corporation from the time of settlement by the
Auditor General and approved- by the State Treasurer.
The purchaser from a corporation should therefore
secure a certificate of tax liens from the Auditor
General.64
59The acknowledgment of the sheriff's deed in open Court,
followed by delivery, cures irregularities, but not a void sale. 2
Troubat and Haly Practice, 1779. Collins vs. Phillips, 236 Pa.

286. See Artile by F. B. Sellers, Esq., in 19 Dickinson Law Review, 233.
6OAct of May 21, 1915, P. L. 285, amended by Act of June 1,
1915,61P. L. 650.
Act of March 13, 1815, 6 Sm. L. 299, and supplements.
62
Act of April 29, 1844, P. L. 486.
63
Act of June 4, 1901, P. L. 264, provided for filing of tax liens
in the Prothonotary's Office at any time before the end of the
second calendar year after the tax becomes due." Sci. Fa. must
issue within five years after filing lien.
Act of March 1, 1917,
P. L.64130.
Act of June 15, 1911, P. L. 955. Lewis vs. Wyalusing L. H.
& P. Co., 62 Pa. Sup. 282.
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The abstract furnished the client consists of the
notes of the exmaination reversed, the conveyance out
of the Commonrwealth, or the earliest conveyance on
record, appearing as the first transfer on the abstract.Usualy the abstract consists of the following in the order
of tract; plot; earliest
description
mentioned:
conveyance on record; then, in order of the time in which
they were actually made, all other conveyances ending
with that to the present owner. The check list is -not
properly a part of the abstract, the exaaniner replacing
that by a certificate of the result of his search.
The examination of the
THE CERTIFICATE.
in so far as the indices
only
complete
records has been
The records do not
of the records are complete.
necessarily disclose the fact of adverse interests in third
parties. The opinion of the examiner as to the validity
of the title involves his opinion, in every insance, on a
great many points of law. In view of the foregoing
most attorneys prefer to certify to their clients that they
have examined the indices of the records and that in
their opinion, or belief, the title in fee simple is vested
in the record owner.
JOHN E. ?AMYEIS.
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MOOT COURT
CITY OF WHEELING'S APPEAL
Trusts and Trustees-Charitable Trusts-For the Benefits of
the Poor-Equitable Conversion-Bequest of Land as Proceeds-Foreign Municipal Corporation as Trustee-Election To Reconvert
STATEMENT OF FACTS
X, in Pittsburgh, devised land in Pennsylvania to the executor to sell it, and pay the proceeds over to Wheeling to administer for the benefit of the poor of the city. The executor
despite the expressed wish of the city, to elect to take the land
instead of the proceeds, is about to sell it. This is a bill against
the sale and to permit the city to take the land as land.
Lehmayer, for plaintiff.
Mashank, for defendant.
OPINION OF LOWER COURT
PERRY, J. Under the provision of this bequest, the property of the decedent was devised to the executor to be sold and
the proceeds given to the City of Wheeling, to be distributed
by them among the poor of the city.
Although this is a highly
indefinite description of the objects of the decedent's bounty,
yet by the settled law of our state, there arises, under such provisions, an implied trust which being for the benefit of the
poor, constitutes a public charity and will be upheld. Yaras
Appeal, 64 Pa. 95; Wilman v. Lex, 17 S. & R. 88; Kimberley's
Estate, 249 Pa. 469; In Re Dulles Estate, 218 Pa. 162.
Under the trust thus created the city thereby becomes the
trustee subject to all the duties imposed upon other
trustees namely, to fulfill and perform the duties and the commands imposed by the settlor of the trust.
And in the answering of any questions which may arise as
to the construction of the testamentary provisions giving life
to such relations, must therefor be governed by the law as it
exists in the domicile of the donor, to wit the laws of this state.
See the cases cited in 20 Annotated Cases 866.
Therefore to determine the nature and the quality of the
interest held by the parties to this suit, we must perforce look
to the laws of our state, governing the same. Upon an ex-
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amination of these authorities, the court is led to the opinion
that the nature of the interest held by the City of Wheeling,
as trustee, is personalty rather than realty, an interest in the
proceeds rather than an interest in the land itself. For, by the
terms of the will, there is imposed upon the executor the express duty of selling the estate. This clause of the will of the
testator is undoubtedly a positive and a pre-emptory order to
sell and it cannot be questioned that it operated as a conversion of the residuary real estate into personalty efficaciously
from the moment of the death of the testator. The intent of
the testator appears to stamp the quality of personalty on the
proceeds of the land, not only to subserve the purposes of the
will, but also to define the Tights of those who may claim thereunder. Miller v. Comm., 111 Pa. 321; Bergdolls Estate, 258
Pa. 108; McClaren's Estate, 238 Pa. 220; Williamson's Appeal, 153 Pa. 508.
The right of the testator to make his land, money, so as to
affect his own purpose, is unquestionable and it follows that the
persons claiming under the will directing the sale, must take
in the character which the will imposes upon the property, to
wit personally; equity regarding as done, that which was intended and should be done, Therefor whatever rights the parties, here seeking relief may have, the same are to be considered for all purposes as personalty; rights not in the realty itself,
but rather in the proceeds which may be derived from the sale
of the realty. 222 Pa. 208.
But in the petition filed, the petitioner asserts a xight to
elect to reconvert and seeks to enforce this right by taking the
land as land and not as personalty, so intended by the donor.
We are of the opinion that this assertion and alleged right cannot be upheld. While it is true that in the application of the
doctrine of equitable conversion, it is well settled rule that if
money be directed by a will or other instrument to be laid
out in land, or land laid out in money, as in the present case,
that the party beneficially interested may in either case, that
the party beneficially interested may in either case, if he elects
to do so, cause a reconversion of such property and take it in
the original state, yet we consider the rule to have no application under the facts of this case as stated. Here the testator.by explicit and commanding terms directed the proceeds and
not the property to be given over to the city, and by them distributed for the benefit of the poor. And these. directions
must be obeyed, for to consider otherwise would be directly in
the face of these positive terms, a violation of that cardinal
principal of the Pennsylvania law, that the intent of the donor
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shall prevail. To consider otherwise would be to allow the
will of the trustee to thwart the will of the one who made the
trusteeship possible.
Furthermore in our opinion, the City of Wheeling is not
the proper party at law to make this election. As stated
above the City is merely the trustee and the poor are those
whom are vitally interested. It is though the latter alone that
the privilege may be exercised. Under our laws an election
to reconvert must be made in the nature of an unequivocable
demand made by all those beneficially interested; not by one
or a few, but by them as an entirety. Such a demand, to be
honored must preserve the rights of all, and none be injuriously affected. Can we, as a court, allow this reconversion to
take place and say that the rights of the poor will thereby be
protected? We think not, but rather consider that the only
manner allowed us in the protection of these rights of the
poor, is by allowing the will of the donor to be exercised and
not thwarted.
As a conclusion we state that the bill is brought, not by
those vitally interested, but by the mere trustee, and we are
of the opinion that the executor has full power to sell the realty as directed; that the election to reconvert has not been made
by the proper party in interest, and that therefor the only right
held by the petitioner is a personal oright in the proceeds and
not a right to the land itself, and we do hereby decree that
the bill for an injunction to stay this sale be DISMISSED.
OPININON OF SUPREME COURT
That the giver of the proceeds of land could forbid the
reconversion into land, is not to be doubted.
The gift here, is of the proceeds of land, to a trustee for
an indefinite cestui que trust. That the thing given, is money is clear. Allowance of the option to take the land as land
is made impracticable, because, (a) the trustee is not the beneficial owner of the money. It is trusted, not to administer
land, but money. The administering of the land is given to
the executor. (b) The City of Wheeling, a foreign municipal
corporation, cannot hold, even as trustee land in Penna.
If
it can take the land instead of its proceeds, it can hold the
land instead of its proceeds, it can hold the land indefinitely.
(c) Only the persons entitled beneficially to the proceeds of
the land can elect to have the courts reconvert the money into
land. Handley's Estate, 253 Pa. 119.
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The well considexed opinion of the learned court below
amply sustains the conclusion reached.
AFFIRMED.

MONIER v. STAPLES
May Be Two
Injury to Horse -Proximate
Cause -There
Causes of the Same Event-Liability For Careless Act
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A fire engine drawn with great noise along the street of
a town, frightened Monier's horse. The fear was subsiding so
that Monier would not have lost control of him but for the
discharge of a pack of fire crackers by Staples, very near to
the horse. He became violently re-excited, ran off, broke the
carriage, threw Monier out, and so seriously hurt himself that
he had to be shot. Defence is that the fire engine caused the
fright, and that Staple's act only protracted it and revived its
intensity; that the crackers would not have caused fright had
the horse not been already alarmed, that the crackers were
only a remote cause of the injury, (if cause at all) the cause
being the free acts of the horse.
Carothers, for Plaintiff.
Delesantro, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
H, CLARK, J. The point upon which this case turns is,
was Staple's act the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury,
or was it but a remote cause? If it be the proximate cause
then Staples is liable to Monier in this action. If it be the remote cause then Staples is not liable to Monier for the injury
done.
It is contended, and justly so, that Staples was negligent in
discharging the fire crackers near the horse. His acts are
within the definition of negligence, as given by Judge Cooley
in his work on torts and cited in 29 Cyc., 415, i. e. "The failure
to observe, for the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance, which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury."
Conceding this, if Staples act was not the proximate cause
of the injury to the plaintiff, he is not liable in this action.
"The question as to what is the proximate cause of the injury
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is ordinarily not one of science or legal knowledge but of fact
for the jury to determine in view of the accompanying cir.
cumstances, all of which must be submitted to the jury, who
must determine whether the original cause is by continuous
operation, linked to each successive fact." 190 Pa. 122.
Marshall v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 240 Pa. 272, is a
The facts in that case were,
case, governing this question.
that the plaintiff's horse was frightened by steam escaping
from an engine, not operated by the defendant. Plaintiff had
quieted his horse and had him under control and he became
re-frightened by the approach of a hand car propelled by the
defendant's employees. The horse, as a result, ran away and
caused the injury for which the suit was brought. The question in that case, being identical with the question in the
case at bar, was whether the proximate cause of the accident
was the escaping steam; in the case at bar, the fire engine,
or the negligent operation of the hand car, in the present case,
the act of Staples, was given to the jury.
The. charge to the jury was, "if the injury was caused
by the fright of the horse from: Dolan's engine, here the fire
engine, there could be no recovery against the defendant, but
that if after being frightened by the steam escaping from the
engine, here the fire engine, the horse was over the fright and
under the control of the plaintiff and was, subsequently
frightened by the negligent operation of the defendant's
hand-car, in this case, the negligent act of Staples, the defendant would be liable." That this was the correct charge, see 33
Cyc. of Law and Procedure, 795, 797.
In 240 Pa. 272 supra, there was sufficient, evidence to
warrant the jury in finding that the horse was over the fright,
caused by the escaping steam, and that it was under the control
of the plaintiff and that therefore the defendant was liable in
that action.
From the facts in the present case, i. e. "that Monier
wouldn't have lost control of him," leads us to the conclusion
that the fright occasioned by the fire engine had not subsided
at the time of Staples act 240 Pa.272 supra, has established
the precedent by which we are to be governed in deciding this
question in favor of the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Staple's discharged fire crackers very near to the horse
of Monier. This was a careless act. It might or might not
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frighten the horse, but that it was apt to do so, is within general observation.
The effect of the explosion was in fact to frighten the
horse. The fright led to the running off, the breaking of the
We
carriage, the injury to Monier, and to the horse itself.
cannot well see, then, how the defendant is to escape responsibility.
There is a possibility that the fright occasioned by the
fire engine left the horse susceptible of fear to an unusual
degree. One state of mind may facilitate the getting into a
second state. One shock makes the second shock the more
easy. Had the question of the liability of those who operated
the fire engine, for the disastrous results been before us, we
might have found reason to hold them responsible, but that
they contributed to the production of the excited state of the
horse which eventuated in the accident, does not negative the
defendant's responsibility for also causing it. There may be
two causes of the same event. The engine's excitation of the
horse is not incompatible with the defendant's co-operating excitation. Nothing in Marshall v. R. R. Co., 240 Pa. 272, is
inconsistent.
It is necessary then that a new trial be had and the judgment of the learned court below is REVERSED.

DELANEY v. WHITE
Mortgage-Lessee's

Right

to

Assignment

tion of Lessee By An Assignment

Mortgagee-Valuable

Thereof--Subroga.

of the

Mortgage by

Improvements-Irreparable Injury

STATEMENT OF FACTS
White had a mortgage on X's land for $4,000. Subject to
this mortgage, X made a lease of the land for five years to
Delaney at the rental of $600 per year, with the privilege of
removing any buildings he might erect, and of repeating the
lease for a further period of 10 years. He erected buildings
costing $8000. Four years after the lease was made White
Delaney then told
issued a scire facias on the mortgage.
White he would pay the mortgage, and tendered the money
and demanded an assignment of the mortgage, White refus-
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ing.

This is a bill in equity to compel him to desist from

selling the land and assign the mortgage.
Thomas, for Plaintiff.
Shapiro, for Defendant.
OPINION OF LOWER COURT
SHEAFFER, J. The salient question for decision in the
case presented is: Can a lessee for years of a mortgagor, taking possession subject to the mortgage and erecting valuable
improvements, secure relief by means of a bill in equity to
compel the mortgagee to discontinue foreclosure proceedings
and assign the mortgage to the complainant on the grounds of
irreparable injury?
It is our opinion, from our understanding of the principles of equity and their application in .the cases hereinafter
reviewed that this question must be decided in the affirmative.
In Wundale v. Ellis, 212 Pa. 618, it was held that: Where
a tenant has covenanted in his lease to pay the interest on an
antecedent mortgage, and it appears that the lease has several years to run, and that the mortgaged premises have been
so used in connection with other property that a severance
would cause great injury, the tenant may, after a suit has
been brought on the mortgage when no interest is due, tender the whole amount of the mortgage and demand an assignment thereof.
Again in Hopkins Manufacturing Co. v. Ketterer, 237 Pa.
285, in which the plaintiff asked for a bill to stay the writ
and compel the assignment of a mortgage, it was held that
the tender of payment to the mortgagee's attorney of record
in the scire facias on the mortgage was all that was required
to entitle the plaintiff to the relief he sought and to justify
the court in granting it. Also, the same relief will be given
under the same circumstances to a lessee for years.
Further, the whole right of the defendant, White, as holder of the mortgage is to have his money paid him, and his
whole claim on the land is to hold it as security foir such payment. When he was offered his money by the plaintiff, Delaney, his refusal to take it is persuasive evidence that he is
not enforcing his legal rights in good faith but is seeking to
use them for some ulterior- and inequitable purpose. Even if
this were untrue, the general doctrine of subrogation is that
where a party can attain all his legal rights in either of two
different ways, a court of equity will compel him to take that
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which will do the least injury to another having a junior interest in the subject matter.
The learned counsel for the defense states that a mortgagee could not be compelled to assign the mortgage on payment, but only to surrender it. Also, he argues that the Act
of June 24, 1885, P. L. 157, provides: in certain cases for
the compulsory assignment of mortgages on tender of the
amount due and that this Act does not cover the case of a
lessee or tenant, and therefore that he is without a remedy.
But these are Common Law remedies and even though it be
conceded, which is by no means clear, that, ordinary cases
must be brought within their terms, it does not follow that an
equitable remedy should not be afforded when a case is presented to which equitable principles apply. The Common Law
was opposed to assignments of choses in action, which it regarded as tending to litigiousness and maintenance: 2 Black
Comm. 442. The general recognition and enforcement of assignments are the growth of modern methods of business and
the development of equity founded on and following such
methods: Bispham on Equity, Sec 164 (7th ed. 1905).
In conclusion, we find no solid reason why the principle
of subrogation that, where. a arty asserting a legal right can
be fully secured in it, and at the same time the interests of
another in the subject matter can be protected from impending injury, should not be applied in regard to the assignment
of a mortgage in favor of a lessee, as well as to any other
case to which the principle is applicable.
We therefore decree that the defendant, White, discontinue the foreclosure proceedings and assign the moertgage
to the plaintiff, Delaney.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
A lessee may have such an interest in the demised land
as will entitle him to tender to a mortgagee, the debt, and to
demand an assignment of the mortgage. Wundale v. Ellis, 212
Pa. 618.
Delaney has taken a lease, which authorizes him after
erecting improvements on the demised premises, to remove
them at the expiration of the lease. If the mortgage is foreclosed, the purchaser will obtain the premises and the improvements will cease to be removable by the leasee; unless he should
become the purchaser, and in competition with other bidders,
he would have to pay not only the value of the land, but that
of his improvements. He has, we think, abundant equity to
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prevent a sale, if he offer to pay to the mortgagee, the entire
debt. If he pays, he should be allowed to hold the mortgage
against the lessor, in order to coerce repayment. A decree
that he be subrogated to the mortgage would be proper.
This subrogation may be effected by an assignment of the
mortgage, and we discover no appreciable reason for the
court's refusal to compel such assignment.
Wunderle v. Ellis.
supra. Hopkins Manufacturing Co. v. Ketterer, 237 Pa. 285.
It will eost the value of a sheet of paper, and of the ink expended upon its phraseology.
The able opinion of the learned court below vindicates
its decision, the appeal from which must be, and is DISMISSED.
MISSED.
BERGNER v. NEBENGER
Slander and Libel-Trespass For Libel-Privileged Defamation-Statements Made in Institution of Legal Proceedings
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Nebenger brought an action of trespass against Bergner
for the value of a horse which he alleged that Bergner had
stolen from him. Before the trial the horse was recovered and
Nebenger suffered a non-suit. This is trespass for libel. The
court charged the jury that "there could be no recovery
whether the action for the value of the horse was brought in
good faith or in bad; whether with or without malice."
Perry, for the Plaintiff.
Glowa, for the Defendant.
OPINION OF LOWER COURT
PHILLIPS, J.
There is here involved a question upon
which the courts of England had to decide many years ago;
namely,---can a person accused of a crime, after it has been
shown that he was innocent maintain an action of trespass for
libel against the prosecutor? The weighty influence of those
early decisions, augmented by the numerous subsequent opinions In accord, is very plainly evident in the decisions of our
courts, even up to the very latest opinion in the Pennsylvania
courts upon the subject, in the case of Kemper vs. Fort, 219 Pa.
85, answering the question in the negative.
In England, so far back as the time of Coke, anything said
or written in legal proceedings was absolutely privileged. In
Cutter v. Dixon, Cokes Reports, Part IV, at p. 14, it was ad-
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judged that if actiom should be permitted in such cases, those
who had just cause of complaint would not dare to complain
for fear of infinite vexation, and in Buckley v. Wood, 4 Coke
14b; 3 L. R. A. 417, "it was resolved per totam curiam that
for any matter contained in the bill that was examinable in
the court, no action lies, although the matter is false, because
it was in the course of justice.'
In comparatively recent times, in Revis v. Smith, 86
E. C. L. R. 127, it was held that no action lies for a statement
made, whether by affidavit or viva voce, in the course of a
judicial proceeding, even though it be alleged to have been
made "falsely and maliciously, and without any reasonable or
probable cause."
Defamatory matter relevant to the cause,
published by a party to the cause, in the cause and to the
Court and parties, is not actionable. If that were not so, every
motion in this or any other court might furnish ground for
action against somebody.
That case was followed by Henderson v. Droomhead, 4 H.
& N. 569, and it was held that no action will lie for words
spoken or written in the course of any judicial proceeding.
The inconvenience is much less than it would be-if the rule were
otherwise. The origin of the rule was the great mischief that
would result if witnesses in courts of justice were not at liberty to speak freely," subject only to the animaversion of the
court. Further see Seman v. Netherclift, L. R. L, C. P. Div.
540; Astley v. Young, 2 Burr, 807 and Johnson v. Evans, 3
Esp. 32.
Upon review of the English authorities, the rule, as deducted from them in Starkie on Slander and Libel, section 213, .s
that "no action, either for slander or libel, can be maintained against ......................
suitors, prosecutors .................
or anything said or done, 'relative to the matter in hand, in the ordinary course of judicial proceeding and the regular course of
procedure, even if it be false and malicious and without reasonable or probable cause." See also See. 196.
The law of France is also opposed to the maintenance of actions of this sort, by the Code de la Presse, Ch. 6, Art. 23.
The majority of the Courts in this country have followed the
English rule, that for any defamatory matter appearing in
pleadings, no action can be maintained, the immunity being
absolute,. The Courts of New York, W. Va., Mass., and Ga.
are still upholding the minority view, which is, after all nothing more than the English rule with a condition annexed. In
Bartlett v. Christhill, 69 Md. 219, it is said "this privilege, protecting against a suit for libel or slander, is founded upon a
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sound public policy which looks to the free and unfettered adininistration of justice, though as an incidental result it may
in some instances, afford an immunity to the evil disposed and
malignant slanderer." Pertinent and material matter written
or spoken in judicial proceedings is privilege4. Rainbow v. Benson, 71 Ia. 301, and in Runge v. Franklin, 72 Tex. 585, it is
said "we believe it is, and ought to be the law, that proceedings
in civil courts are absolutely privileged. Citizens ought to have
the unqbalified rights to appeal to the civil courts for redress
without fear of being called to answer in damages for libel."
The law in Pennsylvania is set forth in Kemper v. Fort,
supra, w*'ich holds that for false and malicious defamatory allegations appearing in pleadings flIed in a court of proper jurisdiction, there is absolutely immunity from a suit for libel at the
instance of the defamed party, when the defamatory words are
relevant and pertinent to the matter or matters to be inquired
into by the court. The authorities are, in the majority, uniform, that when the alleged libelous matter in proceedings is
relevant and pertinent, there is no liability for uttering it. Public policy requires this even if at times the privilege of immunity for false and malicious averments in pleadings is abused.
Justice can be administered only when the parties are permitted to plead freely in the courts, and to aver whatever ought
to be known Without fear of consequences if a material and
pertinent averment should not be sustained. Wrong may at
times be done to a defamed party for which the law provided
no remedy, but the inconvenience of the individual must yield
to a rule for the good of the general 'public.
We find no error in the charge of the trial judge to the
jury.
Judgment for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
Nebenger lost the possession of his horse and was. led to
suspect and partially, at least to believe that it had been previously taken by Bergner. Under the circumstances he had the
right to bring suit for the recovery of the horse or of its value.
He chose the action of trespass, but the horse having been returned to him, in some way, before the trial, he desisted from
the suit, suffering a non-suit. This he was not required to
do, for the return of the horse did not delete the trespass of
taking it away and detaining it.
In his declaration, Nebenger stated the facts as he conceived them; that is, that Bergner had stolen the horse. This,
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if untrue would have been libelous if stated in writing otherwise
than in a judicial proceeding.
But, Nebenger was not bound to allow himself to be remediless if his horse had been taken by Bergner, or if he believed it had been taken by him. In any remedy, he had to
make an allegation. The principle applies, that allegations
made in pleadings are not actionable as libel, because untrue,
because known to be untrue, because made with ill 'Will towards
the person accused. 1 Jaggard Torts, 527, 528; Kemper v.
Fort, 219 Pa. 85, and authorities herein cited. We see no error in the instructions of the trial judge that the plaintiff could
not recover, whether the action "was brought in good faith or
in bad, with or without malice."
In Kemper v. Fort, supra, the court does not decide
whether the words written must be relevant and pertinent to the
matter to be inquired into, to escape the penalties of libel, if
they are false and malicious, but the writer inclines to that
view; 219 Pa. 85, p. 93, but that its falseness and maliciousness do not make it an actionable libel is distinctly asserted.
That the declaration in the trespass case was pertinent
is indubitable.
The plaintiff's hypothesis, on which his action
was brought, was that Bergner had stolen the horse. Then
the allegation of the theft was not irrelevant or impertinent.
Constrained then to reach the conclusion of the learned
court below, we affirm its judgment. AFFIRMED.

